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TREATISE WRITING AND FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION SCHOLARSHIP: DOES 
DOCTRINE MATIER WHEN LAW 
IS POLITICS? 
Richard A. Matasar* 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION. By Erwin Chemerinsky. Boston, Toronto & 
London: Little, Brown and Co. 1989. Pp. xxv, 801. $29.50. FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION 1990 SUPPLEMENT. By Erwin Chemerinsky. 
Boston: Little Brown. 1990. Pp. 134. $9.95. 
Reviewing books is much harder than the "two thumbs up" ap-
proach of Siske! and Ebert. One could merely describe a book, place it 
within scholarly literature, and evaluate it. Or, one could take on a far 
more complex task: rethinking starting points, and measuring a book 
not just on its own terms, but against the framework of an emerging 
new movement in the literature. 
I have unqualified praise for Erwin Chemerinsky's Federal Juris-
diction at the descriptive level. As I develop in the first part of this 
review, it is a thorough, elegantly written summary of basic federal 
jurisdiction principles. It asks difficult questions at the right times, 
places debates on controversial issues at the forefront, gives enough 
history to place law within context, presents competing policy argu-
ments, surfaces the political questions underlying federal jurisdiction 
questions, and forces readers to challenge unreasonable legal princi-
ples. It is the kind of book that those who teach are glad to recom-
mend to students, that those who practice can use for immediate 
reference, and that those who are learning for the first time can read to 
bring clarity to the muck that law often appears to be. I reserve criti-
cism to only one point: the book often reveals underlying ideological 
tensions in doctrine, but does not explicitly offer its own coherent ide-
ology or answers to the problems it raises. 
On a more prescriptive level, however, as someone deeply en-
meshed in studying federal jurisdiction law and scholarship that is in-
creasingly hostile to doctrinal analysis, I wonder whether or not the 
book's careful attention to doctrine makes any sense.1 Given the 
• Associate Dean for Academic Affairs anil Professor of Law, University oflowa College of 
Law. B.A. 1974, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1977, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. 
Many thanks to Dave Baldus, Peter Blanck, Nancy Jones, and Alan Widiss, members of the 
Iowa Law Faculty Writers' Workshop, for their helpful comments and insightful questions. 
1. This is no mere idle curiosity. I am deeply invested in traditional legal scholarship. To 
the extent that developments in my field challenge the utility of treatise writing, they confront the 
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Supreme Court's propensity to treat federal jurisdiction as a special 
preserve, governed by political commitments that make precedents, 
statutes, and policy arguments mere impediments to the enactment of 
whatever philosophy animates the Court at any given time, is it worth-
while patiently to plumb the depths of cases and statutory provisions? 
Is a treatise (or for that matter any federal courts scholarship) that 
treats doctrine seriously a useful tool for understanding law and fur-
thering its development? 
I tum to these questions in the second part of this review with a 
discussion of the "law" of federal courts in an era informed by the 
insights of critical theory. I review the Supreme Court's willingness to 
ignore doctrine and the deep ambivalence of recent federal jurisdiction 
scholarship about whether or not doctrine can constrain deci-
sionmakers. Next, I suggest that treatise writing in general seems in-
consistent with our evolving politicized jurisprudence. I argue that 
although treatises have evolved from their positivist origins, and have 
embraced the policy orientation of realism, they have yet to come to 
grips with law as politics. I neverthless conclude that despite funda-
mental challenges to the value of doctrine, treatises such as Erwin 
Chemerinsky's Federal Jurisdiction are useful to the development of a 
just and fair system of federal jurisdiction. I end with a call for mak-
ing the book, and others like it, even more valuable through the addi-
tion of explicitly normative discussions to their texts. 
I 
In Federal Jurisdiction, Chemerinsky's central purpose is "to de-
scribe and analyze the doctrines and policies that shape the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the United States" (p. xix). The book sets forth 
three subsidiary goals to accomplish this purpose: first, "to state 
clearly the current law defining the jurisdiction of the federal courts"; 
second, "to identify important unresolved issues and to describe the 
positions of the lower courts on these questions"; and third, "to ex-
amine the underlying, competing policy considerations" of each area 
of the law (p. xix). 
The book is organized into three parts. Part I deals with constitu-
tional and statutory limits on federal court jurisdiction. It specifically 
addresses justiciability, congressional control of federal court jurisdic-
tion, congressional power to create legislative courts, federal subject 
matter jurisdiction, and the federal common law. Part II concerns 
federal court relief against governments and government officers. It 
covers the structure of section 1983 liability, the availability of statu-
tory and common law remedies against the federal government and 
importance of my work as well. Thus, it should come as no shock to the reader of this review 
that I am inclined to conclude that Federal Jurisdiction (read my work tool} retains importance 
despite assaults on the value of doctrine. 
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bflicers, state and federal sovereign immunity, and personal immunity 
of government officers. Part III focuses on federal review of state 
court judgments and proceedings. It includes discussions of Supreme 
Court review of state court judgments, statutory controls over federal 
jurisdiction to review state action, Pullman, 2 Thibodaux, 3 Burford, 4 
Younger, 5 and Colorado River6 abstention, and federal court habeas 
·corpus jurisdiction. 
With nothing else, Federal Jurisdiction's superb coverage and ex-
cellent descriptions of the current state of the law would mark it as a 
valuable teaching tool. But the book goes much further; it presents 
the significant questions facing the federal courts and offers cogent 
criticisms of the law (and sometimes legal scholarship).7 
Coverage - A one-volume treatise on a subject as complex as fed-
eral jurisdiction poses very difficult questions about the scope of cover-
age, the issues to highlight, and the topics to stress. Some courses in 
federal jurisdiction focus primarily on cc>mplex civil procedure. 8 
Others concentrate on structural issues such as justiciability, congres-
sional control of jurisdiction, and the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.9 Others primarily address civil rights litigation.10 It is 
2. Railroad Commn. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
3. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
4. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
5. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
6. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
7. The book's only significant failing is that it fails to provide its own approach to the most 
difficult problems it addresses. Thus, while the book elfectively presents the myriad competing 
arguments on contested federal jurisdiction issues, it is agnostic about how the courts should 
resolve these issues. As I discuss below, this flaw undermines the potential power of the book. 
8. Such a course might address topics like venue, Erie, personal jurisdiction, and joinder as 
part of its main focus. Some federal courts casebooks recognize this and provide substantial 
relevant materials. See, e.g., c. McCoRMICK, J. CHADBOURN & c. WRIGHI", CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL CoURTS (8th ed. 1988) (covering such materials); W. McCoRMACK, 
FEDERAL COURTS (1984) (same). 
9. Every federal courts casebook devotes a substantial amount of space to these topics. See, 
e.g., P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-295, 362-500, 960-1089, 1656-1700 (3d ed. 1988); 
D. CURRIE, FEDERAL CoURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 19-138, 139-326 (4th ed. 1990); P. 
Low & J. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1-158, 
159-268, 431-593 (2d ed. 1989); M. REDISH, FEDERAL CoURTS: CASES, CoMMENTS, AND 
QUESTIONS 1-173, 174-327, 408-483, 565-603 (2d ed. 1988). 
10. It is only in the last decade that federal courts materials and courses have begun to focus 
on civil rights litigation. Although federal courts casebooks a decade ago had materials dealing 
with sovereign immunity, they did not have a substantial focus on litigation under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. See, e.g .. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1634 (2d ed. 1973) (index listing only 
five pages on the topic of "[f]ederal protection against state and local public officials"); D. CuR-
RIE, FEDERAL CoURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1030 (2d ed. 1975) (index listing only seven 
topics related to "[s]uits to redress deprivation of civil rights,'' covering less than 100 pages). 
Recent casebooks give extensive coverage to§ 1983. See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. MELT-
ZER & D. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 1090-307; D. CURRIE, supra note 9, 379-425, 474-84; P. 
Low & J. JEFFRIES, supra note 9, at 880-1137. 
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no small or unimportant task for the author of a treatise to choose 
among these topics. 
Chemerinsky chose well in Federal Jurisdiction. He omits most 
procedural issµes such as service of process, pleading, joinder, discov-
ery, and summary judgment, in favor of extensive coverage of struc-
tural issues and civil rights litigation. Given the comprehensive 
coverage of process in most civil procedure courses, and the wealth of 
secondary materials addressing these subjects, Chemerinsky's cover-
age choices are quite sensible. Moreover, his heavy emphasis on civil 
rights litigation sets Federal Jurisdiction apart from other serious sin-
gle-volume treatises in the field.11 
Chemerinsky's decision to include civil rights litigation reflects the 
growing importance of such litigation to the Supreme Court. 12 As fed-
eral jurisdiction courses shift their attention to civil rights litigation, 
Chemerinsky's coverage ensures that Federal Jurisdiction will be an 
important instructional aid; it covers traditional topics, as other books 
do, but it adds new coverage that is otherwise lacking. 
Treatment of Issues - Federal Jurisdiction is more than merely 
descriptive, however. It also identifies the thorny unresolved issues 
that confront the federal system, the important policies relevant to 
thinking about these issues, and, at times, the author's views on the 
proper resolution of the problems posed. 
For example, the book's treatment of the eleventh amendment is 
11. Neither M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OP JUDI· 
CIAL POWER (2d ed. 1990), nor c. WRIGHT, THE LAW OP FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed. 1983), 
specifically addresses§ 1983 litigation. Chemerinsky devotes nearly one fifth of Federal Jurisdic-
tion to litigation against federal and state governments. See pp. 369-488. His additional cover-
age of the eleventh amendment adds another 65 pages analyzing litigation against the 
government. Pp. 325-68. 
While Chemerinsky's coverage sets Federal Jurisdiction apart from other treatises, they none-
theless remain powerful resources for federal jurisdiction teachers. Wright's book is a classic. I 
recommend it to students in both civil procedure and federal courts courses. Even in its current 
outdated version, the book provides significant amounts of information on a wide range of topics. 
I also recommend the Redish book. It is not a conventional treatise, as it makes no claims to 
broad-scale coverage. Rather, the book shows how a thorough and active mind attacks difficult 
federal courts problems. Thus, the book is both an introduction to legal scholarship in the field 
and an inviting target for critical analysis. Either way it forces students to think about the 
subject. 
12 In recent years, the Court has increasingly issued opinions dealing with numerous ques-
tions in cases involving litigation against the government: the eleventh amendment, see Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. 
of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); § 1983, see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 
(1990) (scope of§ 1983); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (definition of 
person); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (municipal liability); City of St. Louis v. 
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (same). 
The growing importance of civil rights litigation influenced Professors Bator, Meltzer, 
Mishkin, and Shapiro to revise substantially the Hart and Wechsler federal courts casebook. See 
P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at xxii. Professors Low and 
Jeffries go so far as to suggest that § 1983 litigation is one of "the two most important structures 
of modern federalism." P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, supra note 9, at xix. 
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full, clear, and challenging. Chemerinsky begins by posing the central 
problem of the eleventh amendment: 
An expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment effectively immunizes 
the actions of state governments from federal court review, even when a 
state violates the most fundamental constitutional rights. Hence, the 
Eleventh Amendment protects state autonomy by immunizing states 
from suits in federal court, but it provides this independence by risking 
the ability to enforce basic federal rights. [pp. 325-26] 
Having posed this problem, the book sets forth current eleventh 
amendment doctrine, theories and policies that inform the doctrine, 
and the unsettled issues facing the federal courts. 
On the one hand, the presentation is quite conventional. It re-
counts the history of the adoption of the amendment, and analyzes the 
major sovereign immunity doctrinal strands from the text of the 
amendment to its expansion in Hans v. Louisiana 13 to its curtailment 
in Ex parte Young 14 to its refinement in Edelman v. Jordan, 15 Fitzpat-
rick v. Bitzer, 16 and more recent cases. On the other hand, however, 
the book takes an interesting rhetorical approach to some of the doc-
trinal incoherency of the eleventh amendment. Chemerinsky ad-
dresses these in a taxonomy of "Ways Around the Eleventh 
Amendment."17 Explicitly analyzing the Supreme Court's varied and 
inconsistent opinions with this particular label reveals the instrumen-
talism 18 inherent in sovereign immunity doctrine and reinforces the 
indeterminacy of federal courts doctrine. It simultaneously provides 
guidance to students hungry for a way to defeat restrictions on making 
the government do the right thing. 
Ultimately, Chemerinsky comes to some hard conclusions about 
the eleventh amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court: first, it 
gives "undue weight to the principle of sovereign immunity"; second, 
its use of history is probably inaccurate; and third, the jurisprudence is 
"increasingly incoherent and wrought with fictions" (p. 367). Yet, in 
making predictions, Chemerinsky is decidedly more reserved, noting 
only that change will be inevitable given new Court personnel, but 
13. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
14. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
15. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
16. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
17. Pp. 343·66. These discussions include the injunctive suit against officers exception, the 
fourteenth amendment exception, and the waiver and abrogation doctrines. 
18. Providing an instrumental guide to those using the treatise is central to its mission. Law-
yers will use whatever tools are available to persuade a judge to find a particular result. Thus, the 
classic treatise presents all available persuasive legal "tricks." This is essentially a neutral, de-
scriptive exercise. Tricks on both sides of an issue are equally presented. As we move into a 
more explicitly political era of legal analysis, treatise writers may need to do more than set forth 
arguments that may be used instrumentally by others. They may need to set forth their own 
analyses of which arguments are superior to others because they will lead to "better" results. See 
infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
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failing to argue for the proper direction of that change.19 
The recent supplement to Federal Jurisdiction suggests that 
Chemerinsky has stepped up his criticism of the Court's eleventh 
amendment jurisprudence, as well as the views of other scholars. 
Thus, he concludes: 
What is troubling about the debate over the Eleventh Amendment on 
the bench and among scholars is the emphasis on textual and historical 
analysis. Both sides attempt to justify their views by invoking the words 
of the amendment and quotations from the Framers about sovereign im-
munity. As is virtually always the case, such textual and historical anal-
ysis is inconclusive. Each side marshals quotations that appear to 
support its position. More important, in light of the extensive criticisms 
of "originalist" constitutional approaches, analysis should not turn on 
the text or the Framers' intent. The real issue to be debated is the rela-
tive importance to be given to state accountability as opposed to state 
immunity. Yet, this has not been the central focus of either the opinions 
or the law review articles. 
Indeed, the reliance on the text and the Framers' intent seems disin-
genuous. Conservative members of the Court think that preserving state 
sovereign immunity is more important than allowing suits against states 
in federal court . . . to redress violations of the Constitution and federal 
laws. Therefore, they search for and use historical evidence to support 
this position. More liberal justices have an opposite position, believing 
that assuring state compliance with federal law is more important than 
upholding state sovereign immunity. Accordingly, they cite textual and 
historical evidence to support this position. 
The real question, then, is not what the Framers might have thought, 
but rather what is the appropriate role of state sovereign immunity in the 
American system of government? Under what circumstances does sov-
ereign immunity justify limiting state government accountability, and 
when should states be liable in federal court?20 
19. In light of the widespread dissatisfaction with the current law ••• change is quite 
possible .... If the Eleventh Amendment only limits diversity suits, then the state would be 
subject to suit in federal court for all violations of the Constitution and laws of the United 
States .•.. On the other hand, state governments would be subjected to more suits, thus 
imposing substantial financial costs to state treasuries and raising the federalism issues in-
herent in Eleventh Amendment analysis. With the changes in the composition of the Court, 
and the close votes in the most recent cases, the law of the Eleventh Amendment might 
change dramatically in the future. 
Pp. 367-68. 
I argue in the second part of this review that treatises traditionally have taken a facially 
neutral approach to controversial questions. They present both sides of an argument and leave it 
to judges and others to reach "correct" answers. I believe that this approach cannot be sustained 
over the long haul. Scholars have views on controversial subjects, and they have the power to 
influence the direction of the law by their views. Thus, their failure to offer their vision (or more 
candidly reveal their predispositions so that others can evaluate their work in context) diminishes 
the power of the presentations they do make. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
20. SUPP. p. 51 (footnotes omitted). I have made similar arguments about the need for forth-
right policy discussion and avoidance of misleading with history in another context. See 
Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 
40 ARK. L. REV. 741 (1987). 
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Given Chemerinsky's call for a discussion of competing policies, 
with full blown ideological honesty, one would have expected Federal 
Jurisdiction to offer a far more substantive conclusion than the one it 
ultimately presents: "It is to be hoped that more candid discussion of 
these questions can advance the debate over the Eleventh Amendment 
and perhaps even resolve the doctrinal mess in this area of the law."21 
That Federal Jurisdiction brings the reader to the brink of a rigor-
ous normative discussion of the eleventh amendment, but then backs 
off, is not, unfortunately, atypical for the book.22 Its treatment of par-
ity is similarly unfulfilled. As discussed in the book, "[p]arity is the 
issue of whether, overall, state courts are equal to federal courts in 
their ability and willingness to protect federal rights" (p. 29). It is an 
issue upon which a wide gulf separates supporters of broad federal 
judsdiction, who argue that state courts cannot be trusted to protect 
federal rights and that federal courts are much more likely to be pro-
tective of those rights, and others who maintain that the two systems 
are equal in their ability to protect federal rights (pp. 30-31). More-
over, the book explicitly notes that the parity discussion is frequently 
pretextual, serving as a screen for conservatives who try to channel 
litigation to state courts to achieve certain substantive goals and as 
cover for liberals who try to preserve federal authority for their own 
substantive purposes (pp. 31-32). Yet, after identifying this split and 
its underlying ideological base, the book comes to the unsatisfying 
conclusion that "[t]he parity debate is probably unresolvable because 
parity is an empirical question - whether one court system is as good 
as another - for which it is unlikely there will ever be any meaningful 
empirical measure.''23 Again the discussion takes the reader to the 
point of understanding the unresolvable doctrinal problem, and seeing 
its normative base, but fails to provide either the author's own value 
21. SUPP. pp. 51-52. In fairness to Professor Chemerinsky, he has developed a more telling 
and cogent position on these issues in his other scholarship. See Chemerinsky, Congress, the 
Supreme Court, and the Eleventh Amendment: A Comment on the Decisions During the 1988-89 
Term, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 321 (1990). I wish that he had brought more of his views to the 
forefront of the book. Otherwise, his criticism directed at the Court and other scholars for their 
failure to articulate and fight about the real issues of government accountability might be turned 
back on his project. As I argue below, Federal Jurisdiction would become an even more effective 
treatise by specifically taking a p0sition on the questions being raised and by laying out the 
fullness of the ideological debate. 
22. Or, for that matter, treatises and legal scholarship more generally. 
23. P. 32. Framing the parity debate as an empirical question may in fact be the nub of the 
problem. Whether state courts in fact are as competent, diligent, and committed to individual 
rights and liberties as are federal courts is unlikely to matter in individual cases, in which individ-
ual litigants believe that one court or the other is favorably disposed to their litigation. Similarly, 
even in the face of contradictory evidence, litigants, judges, and federal courts' scholars are 
deeply influenced by their faith in one system or another. Phrased in this way, parity presents a 
problem regardless of empirical data. The problem is not factual, it is political. Seeing the ques-
tion in political terms makes explicit the underlying competing value choices at stake. Thus, it 
exposes the choice between maximizing state authority by restricting access to federal courts or 
maximizing individual autonomy by giving litigants choices between alternative forums. 
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judgment or a means of evaluating the debate to help the reader re-
solve the problem for herself.24 
Chemerinsky's discussion of federalism and comity issues similarly 
raises ideological stakes, but avoids stating a personal preference or 
even a tie-breaking procedure to deal with the issues.25 Thus, he notes 
24. Chemerinsky has presented a more explicit solution to the problem in a recent article. 
See Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role/or the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. 
REV. 233 (1988) (arguing that parity ought to be a matter oflitigant choice). Advocating litigant 
choice is an attractive alternative when one frames the parity question as an empirical matter, but 
it is not a solution if one sees the problem in ideological terms. What justifies giving the choice to 
the litigant? Is it any more respectful of state authority to pass the decision to avoid state court 
from federal decisionmakers into the hands of individual litigants? If one values placing author-
ity into the hands of local governments, at least for an initial decision, why should that prefer· 
ence be overcome by the competing values of maximizing choice or preserving federal access? 
More plainly, if one's parity attitude is a reflection of a naked preference for the results of one 
forum or the other, how does a preference for litigant choice provide an answer? 
There are reasons that a treatise writer would avoid an extended discussion of such value-
laden questions. Those of us trained as legal realists have a strong commitment to recognizing 
relative merit to multiple perspectives on any given topic. By attempting to set forth a preference 
for one of those perspectives, a legal scholar or treatise writer may undermine some of our tradi-
tional legal commitments to the appearance of neutrality. Treatises were born in a positivist era 
that assumed principles could be found through inductive reasoning and later applied deduc-
tively to reach answers to current problems. Although realists see principles as a complex result 
of reasoning, power, intuition, and intellect, they nonetheless maintain at least a facade of neu-
trality. Doing so fits our rhetorical conventions. But doing so also raises significant questions: 
Why study doctrine if it is nothing more than argument fodder? Why collect cases, carefully 
analyze them, and present competing arguments, if results really turn purely on ideology? I 
address this dilemma below and argue that the collection remains important, but only as a predi-
cate to beginning a more normatively explicit approach. See infra notes 66-70 and accompany-
ing text. 
25. His discussion of standing also illustrates this shortcoming. The main volume of Federal 
Jurisdiction contains a detailed discussion of standing, especially as it evolved during the Burger 
court era. See pp. 48-63. Much of this discussion is quite critical of the Court, but in the end 
does no more than suggest that 
[i]t is difficult to identify a principle that explains why aesthetic or economic injuries are 
sufficient for standing, but stigma or marital happiness are not. The only conclusion is that 
in addition to injuries to common law, constitutional, and statutory rights, a plaintiff has 
standing if he or she asserts an injury that the Court deems as sufficient for standing 
purposes. 
P. 63. The supplement describes a strong antidote to current doctrine by outlining recent schol-
arly criticisms of the Court. See SUPP. p. 12 (citing Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. 
REv. 227 (1990); Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Sunstein, Stand-
ing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988); Winter, The Metaphor 
of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988)). The discussion 
does no more, however, than suggest that these articles are an alternative to the Court's jurispru-
dence. It fails to stake out its own position. See SUPP. p. 12: 
Although the recent articles ... are in many respects quite different, they share a vision of 
how standing doctrines should facilitate the federal courts' crucial role in upholding the 
Constitution and federal laws. This view of standing is quite different from that embodied in 
the decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts that limited access to the federal courts. 
I recognize that Chemerinsky's choice to downplay his resolution of the debate between the 
scholars and the Court leaves it to the reader to make the choice. He therefore avoids stacking 
the deck in favor of his own viewpoint. Nonetheless, I think that he could still leave the matter 
to the reader, but only after weighing in with his own views on the subject, examining the costs 
and benefits of that view and why he rejects contrary views, or making a suggestion as to what 
factors the reader ought to take account of before coming to a judgment, or at least presenting an 
admonition that the stakes are too high to have no opinion as to which view is correct. 
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that "[w]ithout a doubt, a justice's or a commentator's views about the 
appropriate content of jurisdictional rules often depends on his or her 
position on the substantive issues involved," and further, that people 
are willing to favor restriction of federal jurisdiction when doing so 
will achieve a desired result in state court, and that individuals will 
favor expanding access to federal court when doing so results in a pre-
ferred outcome (p. 33). The explicit recognition of the influence that 
these political positions have on the doctrines of federalism and com-
ity, does not, however, lead the author to expose his own. He offers no 
opinion or preference.26 
Even with these criticisms, I want to emphasize the important con-
tribution that Federal Jurisdiction makes. Students who read federal 
courts decisions are often lost, sometimes merely in the complexity of 
the questions raised and the extraordinarily convoluted explanations 
the courts offer for their decisions. 27 Even more often, students fail to 
appreciate the deeply charged political questions that are packed into 
the technical questions in federal jurisdiction cases. 2s 
Federal Jurisdiction always clarifies the muddy, and often makes 
transparent the opaque political stakes of federal jurisdiction issues. 
This makes the book extremely valuable. 
26. Instead, he concludes rather conventionally that 
[j]urisdictional rules often determine the outcome in specific cases; hence, it hardly is sur-
prising that debates over the scope of federal court jurisdiction often turn on views about the 
appropriate nature of American government and, practically speaking, the best courses of 
action to achieve the desired outcomes. Separation of powers and federalism issues are thus 
discussed throughout this volume. 
P. 33. 
27. Everyone has a favorite incomprehensible Supreme Court federal jurisdiction decision. 
My own is National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). The case is 
best known today for its "holding'' that Congress cannot expand federal court jurisdiction be-
yond the limits of article III of the Constitution. Yet, the opinion itself upholds the grant of 
federal court jurisdiction over suits by and against citizens of the District of Columbia - an 
authority not explicitly found in article III. Moreover, majorities of the Court reject each prof-
fered justification for the jurisdiction, concluding that the District of Columbia is not a state for 
purposes of the diversity jurisdiction and that Congress has no power to expand federal jurisdic-
tion. Yet, because each of these theories attracted some adherents (two for the "district is a 
state" argument and three for the congressional power argument) a majority of the court upheld 
the statute. See pp. 178-79 (discussing the case). Only the kind of careful discussion that a 
treatise provides (or the patience to spend an hour of class time just explaining what a court has 
done) can make such a case intelligible. 
28. Students who read Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
50 (1982), often see the issue of whether Congress can give article III questions to non-article III 
courts as a "who cares" issue. They become so lost in the bankruptcy context, which obscures 
the political consequences posed by a decision to permit Congress to manipulate article III, that 
they are thankful merely for a clear answer to the question that the case poses. But when the 
same issue - whether Congress can avoid federal courts - is raised in a more controversial 
context such as busing, abortion, or apportionment, students appreciate the loaded political 
drama represented by so technical a case as Northern Pipeline. Thus, a treatise that constantly 
demonstrates the ideological underpinnings of even the most technical questions, as does Federal 
Jurisdiction, is an immensely helpful teaching tool. 
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II 
Yet, even as I conclude that Federal Jurisdiction is a valuable addi-
tion to the federal courts literature, another voice suggests caution: 
How valuable is a book that is firmly within the positivist tradition of 
treatise writing29 and the realist tradition of policy analysis30 in an era 
of naked political decisionmaking? 
As I suggest below, even though our jurisprudence has become 
avowedly political, treatises such as Federal Jurisdiction retain signifi-
cance to students, practitioners, and judges. In order to enhance their 
importance, however, treatise writers must accept roles as sources of 
authority who affect the politics of decisionmaking. Treatises must 
evolve to become much more explicitly ideological. Treatises ought to 
29. Treatises, such as Federal Jurisdiction, implicitly assume that traditional legal materials 
and analyses matter. Therefore they collect, synthesize, and analyze doctrine flowing from cases, 
precedents, stati.ites, constitutional provisions, legislative histories, and other written legal mater· 
ials. These represent the data from which one can construct "law." 
Such law construction is beholden to positivism. It sees law as a science (though perhaps one 
informed by the art of its practitioners). Treatise writing is a straightforward application of this 
science: First, it applies "laws" contained in constitutional and statutory law deductively to 
govern factual disputes within their ambit. Second, it treats cases as data bits from which one 
reasons inductively to find legal propositions. These propositions then become "laws," similar to 
statutory or constitutional provisions, from which one may deduce outcomes in similar disputed 
situations. Third, it decides novel situations that fall between the crack of the cases and enacted 
laws by analogizing them to extant legal rules. Thus, once the analogy is drawn, the positivist, 
scientific model takes hold and permits deduction and induction to expand accordingly. 
30. Effective realist treatises reveal the inherent weakness of highly formalistic, structured 
models of legal reasoning. Even fully committed, rules-driven positivists recognize the tremen-
dous discretion in conventional legal analysis: one must determine the meaning of ambiguous 
language, choose from competing legal propositions that are equally drawn from prior case law, 
and make judgments about which analogy is properly drawn. Moreover, only the very narrow-
minded fail to recognize law's indeterminacy, at least in difficult cases. Therefore, realist legal 
analysis recognizes multiple possible answers to legal problems. From deciding what a case 
means, to understanding the factual content of either a dispute or the precedents that might 
govern that dispute, to understanding the language of enacted law written generations ago, legal 
analysts must exercise judgment. 
Despite the positivist origin of treatises, realists seek to explain the development of law 
through many external factors - political, cultural, ideological. They embrace policy analysis to 
help resolve ambiguities in legal rules. The best treatises, such as Federal Jurisdiction, discuss 
alternative policy choices from among competing models of public welfare. Armed with these 
perspectives, therefore, such treatises present legal materials against a broad contextual back-
ground that makes doctrine an important, though not exclusively determinant, factor in resolv-
ing debated legal questions. 
Realist treatises may still face a conceptual difficulty, however. While positivists merrily col· 
lect cases and enacted law, "discovering'' the countless ways they cohere, and thereby predict 
future legal developments, realists might well believe that catalogues of cases, statutes, and poli-
cies do little to determine outcomes and that social or political factors better predict decisions 
than do legal principles. Therefore, realists who understand law as highly contingent, internally 
unpredictable, and understandable only in social context, might wonder why they should bother 
assiduously pulling together the law, if the law may better be explained by external factors be-
yond doctrinal frontiers. 
Rejecting doctrine as a force unto itself does not, however, banish traditional legal data from 
legal discourse. Rather, doctrine remains important because of its rhetorical function as a con-
straint on acceptable outcomes. Doctrine sets the terms for policy discussions and outlines the 
range of foreseeable results. Doctrine provides a code for lawmaking. 
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advocate positions.31 
Politics and Ideology in the Law of Federal Courts - Chemerinsky 
notes time and again in Federal Jurisdiction 32 that the law of federal 
jurisdiction is teeming with political undercurrents. As even a cursory 
analysis of doctrine across a wide range of federal jurisdiction topics 
reveals, he couldn't be more accurate: federal courts doctrine is unim-
portant to many Supreme Court holdings. Two illustrations make the 
point: 
(1) The Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine -At 
least since Murdock v. City of Memphis 33 the Supreme Court has pre-
cluded itself from reviewing decisions of state courts that rest on ade-
quate and independent state grounds. 34 One persistent problem that 
the Court has faced in implementing the adequate and independent 
state grounds doctrine has been how to resolve ambiguity in the 
grounds offered in state court opinions. The Court's decisions are a 
jumble of inconsistencies, ranging from presuming the independence 
of state grounds35 to deciding for itself the "true" basis of state 
31. My colleague Bob Clinton has suggested that Felix Cohen's original 1942 Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law may be the best example of an avowedly ideological and instrumental trea-
tise. Thus, Cohen stated his purpose in writing his treatise was to "empower Native Americans 
and avoid their oppression." F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW xix (1942). 
Further he explained that what made the treatise possible was 
a set of beliefs that form the intellectual equipment of a generation - a belief that our 
treatment of the Indian in the past is not something of which a democracy can be proud, a 
belief that the protection of minority rights and the substitution ofreason and agreement for 
force and dictation represent a contribution to civilization, a belief that confusion and igno-
rance in fields oflaw are allies of despostism, a belief that it is the duty of the Government to 
aid oppressed groups in the understanding and appreciation of their legal rights. 
Id. at xxxii; cf. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE (1972) (opinions of 
authors on how to resolve questions sprinkled throughout text, but without self-conscious refer-
ence to underlying ideology). 
32. See supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text. 
33. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). 
34. As I have explained elsewhere: 
A decision based on state law is adequate if the judgment in the case would necessarily be 
affirmed even if any decision on federal law were reversed. For example, suppose in a state 
criminal prosecution the defendant moves to exclude evidence under both the fourth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and under a state's constitution. If a state court 
rules in favor of the defendant under the state constitution, its decision will be adequate to 
support the judgment regardless of the outcome on the federal issue. It is adequate because 
the state is free to extend rights under its own constitution beyond federal law, unless state 
law is preempted. If, however, the state court ruled against the defendant, its decision ordi-
narily would not be adequate, since a reversal on the federal constitutional claim would 
change the outcome of the case. This decision is not adequate because state constitutional 
law cannot be read more narrowly than applicable parallel federal law. A decision based on 
state law is not independent of federal law if the state ground is tied to federal law. For 
example, where a state might bind its interpretation of a state constitutional provision to the 
interpretation of parallel federal provisions, the state ground cannot preclude federal review 
because a reversal on the federal ground will lead to a reversal of the supposed state ground. 
Matasar & Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of 
the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 1291, 1292-93 n.2 
(1986). 
35. See, e.g., Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1956); Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 
54-55 (1934). 
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grounds36 to taking a middle course of asking the state court to clarify 
its opinion. 37 
In spite of the great variance of the Court's opinions, throughout 
the long history of the doctrine none of the Court's decisions had re-
solved ambiguity in state grounds by explicitly presuming Supreme 
Court jurisdiction until Michigan v. Long. 38 In that case the Court 
held for the first time that it would thereafter presume state grounds to 
be dependent on federal grounds, unless the record revealed clearly 
that the federal grounds were cited only as the precedent of another 
forum. The Court then prescribed for state judges how to make suffi-
ciently "plain statements" to assure the independence of state grounds. 
That the Supreme Court's adequacy rules evolved over time is no 
surprise. What makes Michigan v. Long an exemplar of the deeply 
politicized nature of federal jurisdiction scholarship is the way that the 
case turns conventional doctrine on its head and forces judges into 
unnatural positions given their prior writings. The Court justifies its 
opinion on federalism and administration of justice grounds, neither of 
which can be sustained.39 More importantly, however, given the prior 
positions of both the majority and dissenting justices, the best explana-
tion of the holding in the case is that it is a product of ideology or 
36. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 732-33 n.l (1983); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 
667, 670-71 (1983). 
37. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (continuance of jurisdiction pending 
clarification from state court); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (vacating 
judgment to receive clarification from state court upon remand). 
38. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
39. The Court suggests that its novel decision is necessary to "provide state judges with a 
clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and yet.,. 
preserve the integrity of federal law." 463 U.S. at 1041. It is apparent, however, that the opinion 
impinges on the very goals it sets forth: (1) the opinion tells state judges how to write their 
opinions; (2) the Court's direction creates subtle incentives to alter the way state judges think, 
write, and decide cases; (3) the changes may interfere with state judges' role in state political 
processes; (4) the new rule in fact may increase the difficulty in administering justice by creating 
a new layer of federal review that may later be ignored by state judges; and (5) the rule is unnec-
essary given the Court's certiorari jurisdiction. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 34, at 1367-89. 
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result orientation,40 not tight doctrinal analysis.41 
(2) Federal Common Law - Federal common law is court-made 
law that "implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is con-
ditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply 
the traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon 
all the sources of the common law .... "42 Federal common law gov-
erns a wide range of federal litigation. When federal interests are 
strong, and the need for a single rule is great, federal common law is 
specific and uniform; it generally preempts otherwise applicable state 
laws.43 In some instances, however, federal common law minimally 
displaces otherwise applicable state laws because it borrows state rules 
as federal law and preempts state principles only where they seriously 
conflict with federal interests or are otherwise aberrant.44 Moreover, 
in some cases involving disputes between private persons, federal com-
mon law is rejected altogether because the federal interests involved 
are too attenuated to justify displacement of state law.45 
40. Michigan v. Long has been assailed by scholars, see Seid, Schizoid Federalism, Supreme 
Court Power, and Inadequate State Ground 71zeory: Michigan v. Long, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
1 (1984); Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship Between State and Federal Courts: 
A Critique a/Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1118 (1984); 11ze Supreme Court, 
1982 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 224-30 (1983), and state courts, see State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 
255, 261-65 (Mont. 1983) (Shea, J., dissenting); 672 P.2d at 260-61 (Sheehy, J., dissenting), as a 
direct assault on independent state lawmaking power. In particular, the opinion is claimed to be 
a veiled attempt by the Court to undermine state court judges' ability to act to expand the rights 
of criminal defendants. See State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 264-65 (Mont. 1983) (Shea, J., dis-
senting) (citing Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 638 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring)). 
Chemerinsky discusses Michigan v. Long in Federal Jurisdictz"on. P. 546-51. He describes the 
background to the case (pp. 546-47), its facts, holding, and dissent (pp. 547-49), arguments in 
favor of the case (pp. 549-50), and arguments against it (p. 550). He specifically suggests how the 
case might be seen as a purely ideological consequence of the Court's outcome orientation. Pp. 
550-51. Yet, he ends without a view as to the proper rule, concluding only that "[a]t a minimum 
Michigan v. Long clarified the law." P. 551. 
41. As Professor Michael Wells argues, the majority in Michigan v. Long consists of judges 
who in virtually every other context of federal jurisdiction take a narrow view of federal author-
ity. Wells, Rhetoric and Reality in the Low of Federal Courts: Professor Fallon's Faulty Premise, 
6 CoNsr. CoMM. 367, 378 (1989). Further, he suggests that the dissenters are the judges who 
generally are favorably disposed to extending federal power. Id. He then offers the following 
explanation for the result: 
A crude substantive approach to judicial motivation fares much better [than other alterna-
tive explanations of the opinion]. Ambiguity in the state court opinion only matters when 
the constitutional claimant won in state court. If he lost there, then Supreme Court review 
will always be within the Court's power. The Warren Court, whose substantive agenda 
consisted of expanding federal rights, saw no compelling reason to review state court deci-
sions favoring the constitutional claimant. The Burger Court, whose substantive aims in-
cluded cutting back on constitutional rights in favor of governmental regulatory interests, 
sought to root out state courts' overly zealous enforcement of constitutional restraints on 
government. 
Id. at 379. 
42. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (foot-
note omitted) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
43. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979). 
45. See, e.g .• Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977). 
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Recently, the Supreme Court revisited many of these federal com-
mon law principles in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 46 The case 
involved the question whether government military contractors in di-
versity products liability suits are entitled to a federal common law 
defense to suits brought by victims of defectively designed products. 
Despite strong lines of cases suggesting the unavailability of federal 
common law in suits between private parties, and cases suggesting a 
preference for borrowing state law as federal common law in the ab-
sence of a strong justification to do otherwise,47 the Court adopted a 
uniform federal defense that precluded recovery against the 
contractor. 
Boyle is inconsistent with federal courts doctrine. Its result makes 
sense only through an ideological lens. The opinion coheres nicely 
with other Rehnquist Court majority decisions that favor the mili-
tary .48 Similarly, the dissent of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens, who are not usually thought of as hostile to the 
exercise of federal power or the creation of federal common law, fits 
with their usual preference for the individual's right to recover. Boyle 
shows, once again, that in difficult cases, doctrine, no matter how 
closely analyzed, is a poor stand-in for ideology in explaining case 
results.49 
Cases such as Michigan v. Long and Boyle so suggest why recent 
federal courts scholarship has turned from close doctrinal analysis to 
discussing the ideology of federal jurisdiction. That tum is reflected in 
three recent federal jurisdiction articles. 
46. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
47. See Green & Matasar, The Supreme Court and the Products Liability Crisis: Lessons from 
Boyle's Government Contractor Defense, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 637, 643-84 (1990) (arguing that the 
Court's opinion is doctrinally indefensible). 
48. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (no implied right of action directly 
under the Constitution against members of the military command); United States v. Johnson, 
481 U.S. 681 (1987) (tort claims immunity of the military extended to civilian defendants work-
ing with the military). 
49. See Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 849 (1989) (noting unu-
sual treatment of doctrine by Boyle; suggesting political explanation for the case); Wells, supra 
note 41, at 380 (''The evident basis for the outcome [in Boyle] is the current Court's strong 
substantive commitment to giving the military a free hand."). 
Chemerinsky discusses Boyle but does not take a position on whether it was correctly de-
cided. P. 308. 
50. It would not be difficult to expand the list of federal jurisdiction doctrines that are best 
explained by ideological differences among members of the Supreme Court. Good candidates for 
discussion would include the eleventh amendment, the personal immunities doctrine, and the 
supplemental jurisdiction doctrine. Chemerinsky himself has amply demonstrated the problems 
with the Court's eleventh amendment cases. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text. For 
a review of the doctrinal chaos in the Court's personal immunities cases, see Matasar, supra note 
20. A contrast of Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), to Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 
545 (1989), illustrates just some of the many problems with the Court's supplemental jurisdiction 
cases. For a more detailed discussion, see Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": 
Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1399, 1401 (1983). 
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Just a little over two years ago, Professor Richard Fallon published 
The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law. 51 The article asserts that the 
law of federal jurisdiction is a product of two competing ideologies: 
the federalist model and the nationalist model. The federalist model 
resolves federal jurisdiction questions in favor of state court authority. 
It assumes parity between state and federal courts and views the states 
as independent sovereigns, free from excessive federal regulation. The 
nationalist model subordinates state sovereignty to federal rights, as-
sumes the supremacy of federal law, and claims that federal courts 
have an advantage over state courts in protecting individual rights and 
liberties. 52 
Fallon argues that these two competing federal jurisdiction ideolo-
gies are incompatible and that the tension between them has led to 
doctrinal incoherence in the law of federal courts. He demonstrates in 
great detail the many doctrines - for example, abstention, habeas 
corpus, and the eleventh amendment - in which federal jurisdiction 
principles are unstable, contradictory, unpredictable, and volatile.53 
Ultimately, Fallon argues that commitment to the two models of fed-
eral jurisdiction best explains results in cases, 54 and accounts for the 
variance in opinions of different members of the Supreme Court. 55 
Professor Michael Wells takes Fallon's argument to another 
level.56 Wells posits that Fallon is mistaken in thinking that the com-
peting ideological models are "deep structures of understanding [that] 
may determine the resolution of many questions."57 Instead, Wells 
argues that Fallon's competing models of federal jurisdiction are noth-
ing more than signposts to underlying ideological preferences of 
judges.58 Thus, Wells thinks that Fallon incorrectly rejects the thesis 
that federal jurisdiction decisions are a product of a judge's personal 
political preferences. 59 
Wells sets forth a competing explanation of federal courts 
decisions: 
One does not have to be a cynic or a nihilist to believe that judges do 
not always follow the constraints . . . . The law of federal courts in 
general, and judicial federalism in particular, is especially vulnerable to 
the charge that law is merely politics by another name. It is an area 
where decisions often have substantive implications, yet those implica-
tions are oblique, indirect, and uncertain. In addition, the rulings can 
51. Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141 (1988). 
52. See id. at 1143-57. 
53. Id. at 1142-1224. 
54. Id. at 1145-47. 
55. Id. at 1146, 1156-57, 1162-63. 
56. See Wells, supra note 41. 
57. Fallon, supra note 51, at 1147, quoted in Wells, supra note 41, at 372. 
58. Wells, supra note 41, at 373. 
59. Id. at 373-74. 
1514 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1499 
readily be explained in neutral terms, no matter what their real motiva-
tion. Furthermore, much of the doctrine is so recondite that the average 
person, even the average lawyer, is never quite sure what is going on in a 
federal courts opinion. For many judges of all political stripes, the temp-
tation to manipulate jurisdictional principles to serve substantive ends, 
while concealing the dirty deed behind a cloud of Federalist or National-
ist rhetoric, is too great to resist. This happens often enough to justify 
the assertion that naked politics explains most of the law of judicial 
federalism. 60 
In a recent article on the Supreme Court's methodology in section 
1983 cases, Professor Jack Beermann set forth a thesis embracing 
Wells' vision of law as politics, but one which also attempts, as does 
Fallon, to categorize the various motives of the Justices.61 Beermann 
begins with an analysis of several issues under section 1983 concluding 
that the doctrine is in disarray, and that the inconsistencies of the 
Court's decisions are a reflection of its political choices. 62 As he 
concludes: 
Commentators have long attacked the Court's method of construing 
§ 1983, charging the Court with ignoring congressional intent; applying 
false history as a smokescreen for the Justices' personal views; having 
inconsistent theories concerning§ 1983's relationship to the preexisting 
common law and federal structure; and, in general, lacking a theory 
under which to develop the statute. To these allegations I would add the 
charge that some Justices are outright hostile to § 1983 and to § 1983 
plaintiffs, and veil their hostility only thinly beneath the most rudimen-
tary, unelaborated "policy arguments." ... 
The confusion over § 1983 is a symptom of a larger problem, ... the 
"impoverishment" of political arguments in our law. We do not have a 
developed language for addressing the political questions that lurk be-
hind legalistic discussions of§ 1983; instead we apply history that can be 
manipulated to justify any result, statutory "constructions" that are 
never quite convincing, and policy arguments that are more like incanta-
tions of magic formulae than descriptions of consequences in the real 
world .... 
The indeterminacy of legalistic analysis of § 1983 should send us 
back to political discussion over the function and consequences of civil 
rights enforcement . . . . [O]nce the legal arguments ... are exposed as 
indeterminate and politically charged, the reasonable method for the 
courts is to tum back to the political dialogue that legal argument was 
designed to replace. . .. Courts . . . should open up the policy debate to 
competing theories and data, and assess more pragmatically all available 
evidence of the consequences of their policy-based decisions. 63 
60. Id. at 381-82. Chemerinsky presents a very good summary of the Fallon and Wells de-
bate. See SUPP. pp. 1-3. 
61. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989). 
62. Id. at 54-88. 
63. Id. at 52-53 (footnotes omitted). 
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Beermann then goes on to outline what the terms of an openly polit-
ical debate about federal jurisdiction would look like by contrasting 
three competing visions for the federal courts in civil rights cases: the 
liberal, rights-based reformist perspective; the conservative, authority-
defending perspective; and the radical, "tool of oppression" perspec-
tive. 64 He concludes with a discussion of how these political views 
might be used to decide controversial questions under section 1983.65 
· Treatises and Doctrine - Against the backdrop of Supreme Court 
decisions that cast doubt on the value of doctrine, adrift in a sea of 
legal scholarship that questions whether traditional legal analysis mat-
ters at all, Erwin Chemerinsky has described the "law" of federal ju-
risdiction. In spite of the increasingly "disreputable" position of 
doctrine in our evolving jurisprudence, I think Chemerinsky has en-
gaged in a very important enterprise. It is an enterprise, however, that 
must adapt to the coming political model of decisionmaking in order 
to fulfill its potential. 
Federal Jurisdiction is nevertheless an important book, even 
though "law is politics." First, even those of us who think law is poli-
tics in the Supreme Court acknowledge that the lower courts act as if 
they are constrained by doctrine. Thus, lower court judges faithfully 
peruse precedent, try to reconcile irreconcilable cases, look hard at 
history, and weigh competing policy concerns. For them, a treatise is 
extraordinarily valuable. It collects in one place relevant legal materi-
als and it summarizes the range of arguments about disputed ques-
tions. In so doing, treatises save an enormous amount of time and 
guide courts' analyses. 
Second, some questions, even in federal jurisdiction cases, have 
easy, noncontroversial answers. Yet, because an area of law is so vast 
that the typical lawyer, student, or judge can only know a slight por-
tion of the law, treatises are vital to pulling together the grist of appli-
cable legal principles. Having a source that sets forth what is not 
controversial is often far more important to the daily functioning of 
law than a source addressed only to those once-in-a-lifetime disputes 
that work their way the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Third, treatises help students. Perhaps we in the academy have 
forgotten the fog in which we were perpetually surrounded as stu-
dents. Blinded by our ability to see answers to simple questions, and 
64. Id. at 89-94. 
65. Id. at 94-101. I find myself relatively indifferent to the Fallon, Wells, Beermann debate. 
In one way or another each of them is making similar points: (1) that the doctrine of federal 
courts cases cannot explain case results; (2) that the real explanation of federal courts opinion is 
found in ideology, politics, values, etc.; (3) that to understand the direction of the law one must 
look to normativity. I find my indifference to be a function of my instrumentalism. Once we 
know that law is politics, who cares? What prescriptions do we scholars have to move to the next 
level? Thus, as I read Fallon, Wells, and Beermann, I keep wishing that they would go on to set 
forth their views and enter the normative debate. Perhaps that cuts against our tradition as 
scholars, but it does seem consistent with the conclusion that law and politics go together. 
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our belief that difficult questions have no "right" answers, we fre-
quently underestimate our student's need for guidance in even identi-
fying when something is a legal problem - simple or complex. A 
book that provides a blackletter framework within which our students 
can place their questions makes teaching easier and learning more 
likely. 
Federal Jurisdiction succeeds well on all three of these indices. It is 
an important reference for lower court judges facing federal jurisdic-
tion questions. It gives practitioners, students, and scholars clear gui-
dance about the noncontroversial questions of federal courts law. 
Finally, it is a blessing to our students. It is written clearly and con-
cisely. More importantly, it provides answers to many federal juris-
diction problems (answers we scholars might challenge as theoretically 
indeterminant, but which we know are unchallenged, and practically 
speaking, unchallengeable). 
Nonetheless, I am still left with an uneasy feeling that Federal Ju-
risdiction could do more by taking a more explicitly normative ap-
proach. The classic positivist treatise has already given way in the era 
of legal realism to broader, more policy-based analyses. Thus, books 
such as Federal Jurisdiction already contain detailed descriptions of 
competing policy debates, map out contradictions in the law, and pose 
difficult and often unresolvable legal questions. It is only another 
small step, therefore, for such treatises to face squarely assaults on the 
value of doctrine and policy analysis. 
I believe that treatises must now evolve once again, beyond legal 
realism, into avowedly normative tools. If, as the cases suggest, cut-
ting edge issues are decided by implicit values, and if, as recent schol-
arship suggests, politics determine cases, legal scholars and even 
treatise writers may be forced into becoming advocates. 
Treatises are a rhetorically important part of our legal discourse. 
They are keepers of legal traditions that describe fields of law. Their 
powerful recitations of history and the development of doctrine create 
a shared base from which new students, scholars, and judges launch 
attacks on significant issues as they arise. Treatise discussions of doc-
trine, statutes and their interpretations, and relevant policies provide a 
basic framework for analyzing legal problems. These frameworks en-
capsulate the contradictions of law and reveal the competing argu-
ments on disputed questions. 
Therefore, whether intentionally written to influence the develop-
ment of law or not, treatises likely will remain crucial to the rhetoric 
of law. Students "learn" from treatises, lawyers cite them for author-
ity, and judges use them to justify their opinions. 66 Even if one be-
66. Recognizing that the arguments treatises make may influence the results in real cases 
explains why legal realists may write treatises. Cf. Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 167, 179 n.32 (1990) (suggesting that the "only kind of normative legal thought 
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lieves that these instrumental uses of treatises are no more than covers 
for the actual political motivations of legal actors, one should not dis-
miss treatises as unimportant. That treatises are being used to per-
suade suggests power in the positions being taken by authors. At the 
least, treatise writers ought to recognize this fact, see their project as 
influential to the development of law (or how it is discussed), and 
forthrightly state their views. 67 
Facial neutrality in treatise writing has had a long and important 
life. It was the only permissible stance of formalists who thought of 
law as science and who believed in right answers to legal problems. It 
was also a sensible stance for legal realists who used process as a secur-
ity against unbridled discretion, 68 and who sought "neutral princi-
ples"69 to guide decisionmaking. It is hard to imagine, however, that 
treatises can sustain neutrality in face of our current understanding of 
the political nature of law. They are certain to be unpacked and their 
underlying ideological commitments thereby revealed. 
As authority, treatises are used to make arguments, to do justice 
and injustice, and to influence others. For a treatise writer to assert 
neutrality, when others will use the work in ways that the writer 
would find abhorrent, is a forsaking of professional responsibility. 
Treatise writers and other legal scholars ought to take the next logical 
that might actually be having some significant and authentic normative effect on judicial deci-
sionmaking ••• is the work of treatise writers," but discounting the effect because treatises simply 
reflect "the modes of thought and norms already extant in the courts."). Treatise writers are 
lawyers. They have political beliefs. They know how to make instrumental use oflegal materials 
to further those beliefs. Unfortunately, acknowledging the instrumental rhetorical function of 
treatise writing may bring scholars into conflict with one of the most important presuppositions 
of "scholarship" - neutrality. 
Scholars often act as if all competing policy choices are equally plausible or valid as a matter 
of choice. Their desire for just results resides in their faith that the process oflawmaking ensures 
its ultimate fairness. Accordingly, if they must recognize simultaneously that the form of the 
arguments they make in their scholarship may influence a decision, they must question neutrality 
itself. They must accept that those who create arguments bear some responsibility for how law 
develops. 
Most legal actors, including those who write treatises, have some impression about what 
results they would prefer. Thus, the treatise writer who has a belief in the correctness of any 
given result, but who writes with a facade of neutrality, may inadvertently help to produce "bad" 
law when others make instrumental use of the writer's work. 
67. Writers ought to place their views at the forefront, and thereby subject them to scholarly 
and judicial debate. Hiding their views prevents them from being challenged and impoverishes 
our discourse. Furthermore, treatise writers should take an advocate's role. Doing so empowers 
readers to better assess the value of the arguments raised by the writer (which now may be 
hidden behind a positivist facade), and subject them to oversight by others who have a contrary 
view. Doing so enables writers openly to reveal the hidden forces that shape their legal analysis. 
I'm tempted to think of this as an ethical imperative for legal scholars. Lawyers are already 
in the moral quandary of separating their professional and personal selves. See Matasar, The 
Pain of Moral Lawyering, 75 IOWA L. REv. 975 (1990). We in the academy would be well-
served to avoid the same trap. 
68. See Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REv. 688, 689-702 (1989) (exploring process com-
mitment of federal courts scholars a generation ago). 
69. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
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step: they must take explicit positions on legal issues, justify them 
under conventional analysis, explore competing policies, make clear 
the underlying political or ideological issues involved, and state their 
own positions on those issues. 
Law often can be reduced to choices between equally plausible an-
swers to problems. Our answers to such questions must be justified, 
honestly. The problem is one of tie breaking; treatises can help us 
design tie-breaking strategies. 10 
I have asked whether doctrine continues to matter in the ever-
evolving legal discourse of which treatises are a part. By pondering 
the role of treatise writing in the coming years, I have posed a question 
70. My own tie breaking procedure in federal jurisdiction cases is pretty complicated. As a 
child of the civil rights and antiwar movements, I came to think of the federal courts as critical to 
the maintenance of a just society. By inclination, therefore, I believe that federal courts ought to 
be freely accessible. Accordingly, in jurisdictional disputes - such as whether a federal court 
should abstain, or whether sovereign immunity should bar a federal court from issuing a remedy 
to an individual harmed by state action - I favor federal access. I recognize that others come 
from a different perspective. They see the federal courts as interfering with the basic freedoms 
associated with living in a particular state. They see the federal courts as impeding the will of 
local majoritarian political preferences. They resolve ambiguity against access to federal court. 
Both they and I can muster cases, statutes, histories, and interpretations of various legal 
positions. We both can generate strongly felt "policy" claims. We have tied. Our goal in tie 
breaking is now to capture those who have less committed predispositions with the arguments we 
raise. Good tie breaking rhetorical practice calls for further justifications beyond our naked 
preferences, although such preferences alone succeed if we can garner the votes. Elegance seems 
to suggest that we set forth some additional rationales for our preferences. 
For me, the next step in constructing a rationale for favoring federal court access is to pose a 
rhetorical question. Since neither I, nor my opponent, can "prove" the correctness of our posi-
tion, perhaps the best measure of which view to adopt is to choose the one that will cause the 
least harm if it is "incorrect." Simply put: What happens if a court erroneously adopts one 
preference for federal access as opposed to the other? Can an "error" in one direction be more 
easily corrected than an "error'' in the opposite direction? 
I make the following argument: open access to the federal court generally benefits plaintiffs 
because they are usually the parties who seek federal jurisdiction. The class of plaintiffs in much 
of federal litigation - minorities, criminal defendants, victims of economic misbehavior - is 
poor, unorganized, and relatively powerless, at least in comparison to the class of defendants in 
federal court. That class of defendants - police officers, other government officials, economi-
cally organized enterprises, and governments themselves - is generally harmed by resolving 
ambiguity in favor of federal access because the class is frequently opposed to federal jurisdiction. 
The class members are, however, wealthier, better organized, and more powerful than the plain-
tiffs. Thus, at least at the margin, we might expect that those harmed by resolving ambiguity in 
favor of federal access are more likely than those benefited by access to reverse "erroneous" 
federal jurisdiction decisions. Given that those harmed by access are closer to the state gov-
erning process, and that they often represent state majoritarian positions (or at least are capable 
of organizing as an interest group to affect those positions) they would seem to be more likely to 
use political process to override the decision to open federal court access than would their oppo-
nents. To this tale one might add structural and institutional reasons for federal judges - who 
possess life tenure and protection against the diminishment of their salaries - to protect those 
with less power to influence majoritarian political process. Therefore, courts ordinarily should 
resolve ambiguity in favor of open access. 
Of course there is a contrary position - trust me, I can set it forth if necessary. The point of 
tie breaking is not to prove that one is correct. The purpose of spelling out the complicated set of 
judgments that go into tie breaking is to force a truthful exchange on why scholars and courts 
reach certain outcomes. What I advocate then is nothing more novel than saying that we should 
state what we believe and reveal the complex inner voice that helps us deal with the difficult 
questions. 
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not just to the relevance of the treatise, but to the work of all of us who 
read cases and statutes for a living and believe that what we say and do 
may influence law. Doctrine does matter. It is the fundament of all 
legal analysis, even in cases where law is ideology with another name. 
Books such as Federal Jurisdiction stand on the threshold of an emerg-
ing vision of law and legal scholarship. We scholars must shed our old 
neutral veneer and take on a clear ideological shine. 
